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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel paper finger-
printing technique based on analyzing the translucent patterns
revealed when a light source shines through the paper. These
patterns represent the inherent texture of paper, formed by the
random interleaving of wooden particles during the manufac-
turing process. We show these patterns can be easily captured
by a commodity camera and condensed into to a compact 2048-
bit fingerprint code. Prominent works in this area (Nature 2005,
IEEE S&P 2009, CCS 2011) have all focused on fingerprinting
paper based on the paper “surface”. We are motivated by the
observation that capturing the surface alone misses important
distinctive features such as the non-even thickness, the random
distribution of impurities, and different materials in the paper
with varying opacities. Through experiments, we demonstrate
that the embedded paper texture provides a more reliable
source for fingerprinting than features on the surface. Based
on the collected datasets, we achieve 0% false rejection and
0% false acceptance rates. We further report that our extracted
fingerprints contain 807 degrees-of-freedom (DoF), which is much
higher than the 249 DoF with iris codes (that have the same size of
2048 bits). The high amount of DoF for texture-based fingerprints
makes our method extremely scalable for recognition among very
large databases; it also allows secure usage of the extracted
fingerprint in privacy-preserving authentication schemes based
on error correction techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure paper documents. Designing secure documents that
provide high levels of security against physical forgery is a
long-standing problem. Even in today’s digital age, this prob-
lem remains important as physical paper is still prevalently
used in our daily lives as a means to prove data authenticity, for
example, in receipts, contracts, certificates, and passports. A
recent trend in this area (e.g., in e-passports) is to embed elec-
tronics such as RFID chips within the physical document in
question [1]. However, the security of such solutions depends
on the tamper-resistance of the chip which must securely store
a long-term secret [2]. This tamper-resistance requirement can
significantly increase the cost of production. In view of the
importance of ensuring the authenticity of paper documents,
researchers have been exploring applying digital technologies
to prevent counterfeiting. One promising method is based on
measuring the unique physical properties of paper that are
impossible to clone.
This manuscript has been accepted for publication in the ACM Transactions
on Privacy and Security (TOPS, formerly TISSEC) in 2017.
Paper fingerprinting. Manufacturing a paper sheet is a
complex process and each paper sheet is a unique product
from that process. Typically, wooden particles are used as the
base, and multiple substances are subsequently applied to stick
these particles together to stabilize their placement and shape
a thin, usually white, steady surface which we call paper.
In an article published in Nature in 2005, Buchanan et al.
observed that the surface of a paper sheet is imperfect – it
contains random non-evenness as a natural outcome of the
paper manufacturing process [3]. They propose to utilize the
surface imperfections to uniquely identify the paper. Their
method is to use a focused laser beam to scan a pre-designated
region on the paper sheet from four different angles, and
continuously record the intensity of the reflected laser. The
recordings then constitute a unique digital representation of
the paper, called “paper fingerprint”. Therefore, Buchanan et
al.’s method [3] is the basis of a number of follow-up works,
notably [4], [5].
Clarkson et al. (IEEE S&P, 2009) subsequently showed
that a commodity scanner could be used to effectively extract
paper fingerprints based on the same surface imperfections [6].
Their method is to scan the paper surface from four different
angles and then construct a 3-D model. Then the 3-D model
is condensed into a concise feature vector, which forms the
paper fingerprint.
Later, Sharma et al. (CCS, 2011) proposed another approach
named PaperSpeckle, which uses a microscope with a built-in
LED as the light source to extract the paper speckle patterns at
the microscopic level (1–2 microns) [7]. The underlying idea
in PaperSpeckle is based on the concept of speckles: i.e., when
light falls on a paper sheet, the scattered light forms randomly
mixed bright and dark regions, which can then be captured by
a microscope. The captured image can be further processed to
produce a compact binary fingerprint.
Our idea. So far, prominent works in this area have
primarily focused on the imperfections of the paper surface.
In contrast, our work is inspired by the observation that the
wooden particles constituting the building blocks of a paper
sheet scatter over the paper quite irregularly. We hypothesize
that this irregular placement of wooden particles provides a
unique pattern, which can be extracted and used as a paper
fingerprint. We call the unique pattern caused by the random
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(a) Paper Surface (b) Paper Texture
Fig. 1: The surface and texture of the same area of a paper
sheet as captured by a camera based on a) reflective and b)
transmissive light.
interleaving of wooden particles the texture of paper.
Unlike previous works that measure the paper surface char-
acteristics, we propose to fingerprint a paper sheet based on
measuring the paper texture patterns. We capture the texture
by putting a light source on one side of the paper and using a
commodity camera to take a photograph on the other side. This
is intuitively based on the common observation that putting a
paper sheet under light will immediately reveal rich irregular
textural patterns visible even to the naked eye. Figure 1 shows
the difference between photos taken of the paper surface
(based on reflective light) and of the paper texture (based on
transmissive light).
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• We revisit paper fingerprinting and propose to use the
textural patterns revealed by passing light through a paper
sheet as a reliable source for extracting a fingerprint, as
opposed to previous measures which are based on paper
surface imperfections.
• We design an efficient paper fingerprinting algorithm
based on error correction and image processing tech-
niques, and carry out experiments to show that our
method can be used to efficiently extract a reliable and
unique fingerprint using a photo taken by an off-the-shelf
camera. Our proposed method is feasible and inexpensive
to deploy in practice.
• We conduct further experiments to demonstrate that our
method is robust against: (a) non-ideal photo capturing
settings such as when the paper is rotated and the light
source is changed, and (b) non-ideal paper handling situ-
ations such as crumpling, soaking, heating and scribbling
on the surface.
II. PAPER TEXTURE
When light falls on an object, it is partly absorbed, partly
reflected, and partly transmitted, and paper is no exception.
Absorption occurs based on the resonance principle: the en-
ergy of the light waves of a specific frequency is absorbed
and transformed into kinetic energy by electrons of the same
frequency. The part that is not absorbed, is either reflected or
transmitted depending on how opaque (or conversely transpar-
ent) the paper is.
Different types of paper behave differently in terms of how
much light they absorb, reflect or transmit. This behaviour
depends, among other factors, on pulp material, density,
thickness and coating substances. Opacity, as defined by the
ISO 2471 standard [8], can be seen as an indicator of how
much light is impeded from transmitting through the paper,
with the opacity of 100% defined for fully opaque papers.
Typical office printing paper, with grammage between 75 to
105 g/m2, has opacity between 86% to 94%. To put this in
perspective, opacity for newsprint paper (typical grammage:
40–49 g/m2) is in the range 90–94% and for tracing paper
(typical grammage: 60–110 g/m2) is in the range 24–40% [9].
These values suggest that a considerable proportion of light
transmits through such paper, which forms the basis of our
proposal to fingerprint paper based on its textural patterns.
Intuitively, the textural patterns created and stabilized
throughout the paper in the process of manufacturing can
provide a promising source for paper fingerprinting. These
patterns are naturally occurring and appear random. Moreover,
they are embedded within the bonded structure of the paper
and hence are relatively well-protected against manual han-
dling of paper. They are generated as a result of the wooden
particles randomly interleaved during the manufacturing pro-
cess. Finally, once in the finished product, the randomly inter-
leaved wooden particles can not be altered without damaging
the paper, hence making any tampering act evident.
To capture the embedded textural patterns of paper and
subsequently extract a fingerprint, we limit ourselves to a
single photo taken by a commodity camera. This makes our
solution more practical and quicker than the previous proposal
[6] that has to take multiple scans (on paper surface) from four
different angles in order to compute a fingerprint. We note
that a single photo is feasible in our case because the paper
texture contains richer features than the paper surface, such
as the thickness of the overlaying wooden particles, randomly
distributed impurities, and different embedded materials with
varying opacities. In the rest of the paper, we conduct experi-
ments to show that we can reliably extract a paper fingerprint
from the textural patterns.
Applications. A vast number of official and legal docu-
ments, certificates, official receipts and invoices are printed on
regular office paper (sometimes with watermarks, holograms
or other security measures), thermal paper, or other types of
paper. A property that the majority of these types of paper have
in common is that they are not completely opaque. This means
that a considerable amount of light passes through them.
Furthermore, embedded irregular textural patterns as a natural
result of the manufacturing process seem to be a universal
property of all these different types of paper. Consequently,
there is considerable potential for exploiting paper fingerprints
extracted from embedded textural patterns in order to validate
the authenticity of such official and legal documents.
III. TEXTURE ANALYSIS
In this section we discuss a high level description of our
proposed method for capturing paper textural patterns and
Fig. 2: Step-by-step rotation recognition process in the preparation phase. The last step produces a mask that distinguishes
the pixels containing reliable information suitable for feature extraction (black region) from the pixels containing unreliable
information (white region).
extracting a reliable and unique paper fingerprint from those
patterns. To be able to capture paper textural patterns, we take
a digital photograph of the paper sheet through which light is
projected. Then, we need to perform a series of preparation
operations such as aligning and resizing of the original image.
Afterwards, in the texture analysis phase, we utilize 2-D Gabor
filter [10] to extract textural information from the captured
image. Subsequently, we propose a simple paper fingerprint
extraction method that generates a binary string, the paper
fingerprint. Once paper fingerprints are in the binary string
format, they can be compared using well-known methods, such
as computing the fractional Hamming distance between any
two paper fingerprints. In the following, we give more details
about the preparation phase, Gabor transform, the fingerprint
generation method, and the fingerprint comparison method
based on fractional Hamming distance. Further implementa-
tion details and settings of our experiments will be discussed
in Section IV.
A. Preparation Phase
The preparation phase consists of operations of identifying
the designated area of the photo which is to be used for
fingerprint extraction and aligning the image in terms of
movement and rotation. To indicate the fingerprinting area, we
print a small rectangular box on the paper sheet. In addition,
we print a filled square on the bottom left of the box, to allow
automatic alignment by our implementation.
As shown in Figure 2, aligning the rotation of the image
involves several steps. First, we start with a photo of the
fingerprinting area. The photo is converted into grey scale. The
printed region (the rectangular box and the filled square) can
be easily identified by applying a grey-scale threshold. This
threshold is computed by the Otsu method [11], which chooses
the threshold in a such way to minimize the interclass variance
of black and white pixels. We have applied the same approach
for both reflection and transmission analyses. We observe
that the borders in both reflection and transmission samples
were recognized correctly using this technique. The result is
a binary image: “0” for black and “1” for white. This simple
thresholding may also produce some “noise” scattered around
the image, but they can be easily removed based on area. To
ensure the borders of the printed rectangle are connected, we
draw a convex hull of the outer pixels to form a connected
shape. This process also identifies artefacts, e.g., caused by
pen scribbling as we will test in the robustness experiments.
The pixel positions of identified artefacts are defined in a mask
function, which we explain below.
Once the printed rectangle is identified, we fill up the region
within the rectangular border with the binary value ‘1’ (white).
We identify the centre of mass of the rectangular object based
on computing the first-order moment [12] and use that as the
new origin of the Cartesian coordinate system. This corrects
any misalignment due to paper movement.
Then, we need to correct any misalignment caused by rota-
tion. This is based on computing second-order moments [12]
in the new Cartesian coordinate system. Let B(x, y) denote
the binary 2D object in Cartesian coordinates representing the
recognized rectangular box area. There are three second-order
moments as follows:
u20 =
∫∫
x2B(x, y) dx dy
u11 =
∫∫
x y B(x, y) dx dy
u02 =
∫∫
y2B(x, y) dx dy
The rotation of the binary 2D object B(x, y) can now be
calculated as follows:
θ =
1
2
tan−1
(
2u11
(u20 − u02) +
√
(u02 − u20)2 + 4u211
)
(1)
The above formula – based on a method originally proposed by
Teague [12] – calculates the angle between the x axis and the
major axis of an ellipse that has equal second moments to the
recognized rectangular box. It gives us the counter-clockwise
rotation of the object with respect to the horizon. After θ is
calculated, the image can be rotated accordingly.
It is worth noting that in the captured image, the borders
of the rectangles are slightly curved rather than being straight
due to lens artefact. This slight curvature does not affect our
alignment algorithm. We use the raw bitmap image acquired
from the camera instead of the processed jpeg image. This raw
image is stored separately in the camera in the “.rw2” format
and contains the raw information captured by the camera
sensor without any processing.
After rotation is corrected, the image is delimited to the
lowest and highest x and y values of the coordinates of the
pixels inside the recognized rectangular box. This image is
denoted by I(x, y). Meanwhile, the mask for the image is
calculated as M(x, y). This mask is a binary vector with the
same dimensions as I(x, y) with the value ‘0’ indicating the
corresponding pixel in I(x, y) to be masked out from the
Hamming distance computation. In general, two categories of
pixels are chosen to be masked out in our procedure. The
first is the pixels with the intensity greater than the threshold
computed by the Otsu method [11] and not considered as
“scattered noise” in the border recognition phase. These in-
clude the printed rectangle, the filled square inside the box and
any artefacts such as random pen scribbling. The second is the
pixels outside the recognized box including all the edges in the
picture. See the last diagram in Fig. 2 for an illustration. These
pixels are considered to contain unreliable information. They
are identified as ‘0’ in a binary mask vector (similar to the
identification of eyelids and eyelashes in iris recognition [13])
and will be excluded in the subsequent Hamming distance
comparison process.
B. Gabor Filter
Gabor filters are mainly used for edge detection in im-
age processing. Besides, they have been found to perform
efficiently in texture discrimination. Gabor filters are able to
extract both coherent and incoherent characteristics of textural
patterns [14]. Coherent properties are the patterns which
remain unchanged between snapshots of the same sample
while incoherent ones refer to the patterns which change
between snapshots of different samples. The two dimensional
Gabor wavelets are popular in biometric recognition problems
such as iris recognition [13], fingerprint recognition [15] and
face recognition [16]. A Gabor filter’s impulse response is
basically that of a Gaussian filter modulated by a sinusoidal
wave. Consequently, Gabor filters capture features in both the
frequency and spatial domains. Generally speaking, a Gabor
filter would consider the frequency of a pattern (“what”)
as well as the two-dimensional (2D) position of the pattern
(“where”) [14]. Let exp be the natural exponential function.
The 2D Gabor wavelet is calculated as follows using Cartesian
coordinates:
G(x, y) =
f2
piηγ
· exp
(
η2x′2 + γ2y′2
2σ2
)
· exp (2piifx′) (2)
for x′ = x cos(θ) + y sin(θ) and y′ = −x sin(θ) + y cos(θ)
where f is the frequency of the sinusoidal wave, η and γ are
constant factors that together determine the spatial ellipticity
of the Gabor wavelet, θ represents the orientation of the
ellipticity, and σ is the standard deviation of the Gaussian
envelope.
Depending on the frequency of the sinusoidal wave and
the orientation of their ellipticity, Gabor filters are capable of
discriminating different textural characteristics. Usually, Gabor
filters with a range of different frequencies, known as scales,
and a range of different orientations are applied to find out
the best combination of scale and orientation for a specific
texture analysis problem. For a fixed maximum frequency
fmax and a maximum of U scales, each scale index u defines
the frequency f used in Equation 2 as follows:
∀u ∈ {1, 2, . . . , U} : f = fmax√
2
u−1 (3)
For a maximum of V orientations, we consider V angles
equally distributed from 0 to pi. Each orientation index v
defines the orientation θ used in Equation 2 as follows:
∀v ∈ {1, 2, . . . , V } : θ = v − 1
V
pi (4)
We apply a Gabor filter to grey-scale images. Let I(x, y)
represent the grey-scale image using Cartesian coordinates.
The result of the application of Gabor filter G(x, y) is simply
the 2D convolution of I and G as follows:
C(x, y) = I(x, y) ∗G(x, y) =
∫∫
I(x, y) G(x− η, y − ξ) dη dξ
The result C(x, y) is a complex number for each x and y.
C(x, y) can be alternatively viewed as a matrix with the
discrete values of x and y mapped to the columns and rows.
Throughout the paper, we use functions defined over Cartesian
coordinates and matrices interchangeably.
C. Fingerprint Generation
Our fingerprint generation method takes the output of a
Gabor filter and produces a binary string. Let the element
located in row j and column k of the matrix C(x, y) be
mjk = a + bi. We define a 2-bit Gray code based on which
quarter of the complex plane the element mjk = a+bi falls in
(see Figure 3). For example, when a and b are both positive,
the encoded value will be 11. Thus, every element in the matrix
is replaced by two bits. The result is a binary string which we
call the paper fingerprint.
D. Fractional Hamming Distance
After paper fingerprints are generated, fractional Hamming
distance between any two fingerprints can be used to compare
them. Hamming distance is simply the number of positions
in which the bits disagree between two fingerprints. This is a
classical bit error rate (BER) metric in communication. Frac-
tional Hamming distance is the normalized version, resulting a
value between 0 and 1. Usually masking is used to discard the
effect of irrelevant bits in a fingerprint. For each fingerprint, a
mask is defined as a binary string of the same length in which
bits corresponding irrelevant positions are set to 0 and bits
corresponding effective positions are set to 1. The masks are
calculated in the preparation phase as discussed above. Given
two fingerprints f1 and f2, and their corresponding masks
m1 and m2, the fractional Hamming distance is calculated
as follows:
HD(f1, f2,m1,m2) =
‖(f1 ⊕ f2) ∩m1 ∩m2‖
‖m1 ∩m2‖ (5)
where ⊕ denotes the bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR) operation
and ∩ denotes the bitwise AND operation. A relatively small
fractional Hamming distance indicates that the two fingerprints
Im
Re
code = 11code = 01
code = 00 code = 10
Fig. 3: Gray code for a complex value mij = a + bi in the
complex plain.
are likely to belong to the same paper sheet, while a relatively
large fractional Hamming distance (around 0.5) indicates that
the two fingerprints are likely to belong to different paper
sheets. In the rest of the paper, we simply use Hamming
distance (or HD for short) to refer to fractional Hamming
distance.
IV. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate our suggested method for paper finger-
printing, we collected several datasets in different situations.
In this section, we first explain the parameter settings and
experiment configurations under which we carried out our
evaluations. Then, we provide the details of the evaluation
framework that we use to assess the results of our experiments.
In particular, we consider metrics used for evaluating the
effectiveness of biometric systems as well as those used for
evaluating the effectiveness of physical unclonable functions
(PUFs), since paper fingerprints can be seen as both. Sub-
sequently, we give results that justify the choices we had to
make in terms of how we collect our datasets and settings we
use for Gabor filter. Finally, we give the details of our main
dataset collection and provide the results of our experiments,
including evaluation of the proposed method against biometric
and PUF metrics.
A. Parameter Settings & Experiment Configurations
In order to obtain consistent fingerprints, we require that a
relatively small but fixed part of a sheet of paper is used as a
source of fingerprint extraction. We chose to print a rectangular
box (37mm×57mm) on the sheet to indicate this area. In
addition, we printed a small filled square (5mm×5mm) at the
bottom left of the box (see Figure 10). Using this small square,
in our preparation phase our method can check that the rotation
has been carried out correctly (distinguishing cases when the
paper is placed upside-down or flipped).
The original photos in our experiments are all 3456×4608
pixels. After the preparation phase, we get a corrected and
delimited image of variable size, ranging between around
2300×3300 pixels to 2350×3350 pixels. This image is then
resized to a 640×640 pixel image I which is then given as
input to Gabor filter. The rectangular size conversion is for
the convenience of applying Gabor wavelets in the next stage
to produce 2048 bits in the output (the same size as an iris
code). We use a Gabor impulse response of size 100×100
and the output of Gabor filter in our experiments, C, is a
complex matrix of size 640×640. This matrix is downsampled
to one of size 32×32, before being given as input to the
fingerprint generation algorithm. This downsampling process
is done by simply picking the elements in every 20th row and
20th column. Fingerprint generation replaces each complex
value with two bits. Hence, the final paper fingerprint is a
string of the size 2×32×32=2048 bits.
We chose to downsample the output of the Gabor filter for
two reasons. First, it makes the data storage more compact.
With 2048 bits (256 bytes), we are able to store the fingerprint
in a QR code as part of an authentication protocol (we will
explain the protocol in more detail in Section VI). Second,
adjacent pixels in the image are usually highly correlated.
Hence, downsampling serves to break the correlation between
bits. Through experiments, we found this simple downsam-
pling technique was effective to produce reliable and unique
fingerprints.
All images have been captured by a Panasonic DMC-FZ72
camera with a resolution of 16.1 Mega-pixels. We chose this
camera for two main reasons: the ability to capture a photo in
macro mode from a short distance (minimum 1 cm focus) and
the ability to mount a macro flash ring over the lens. However,
these characteristics are not unique to this specific camera and
many other cameras available in the market provide the same
characteristics. We mounted an off-the-shelf common macro
flash ring on the camera lens, to maintain a constant distance
between the lens and the paper surface where the texture is
photographed. The camera and its accessories are shown in
Figure 4(a). In our experiments, we do not use the flash of the
macro flash ring; the light source is an ordinary office overhead
projector as shown in Figure 4(b). The light that the overhead
projector provides is intense and adjustable. Furthermore, it
has a flat surface with constant distance from the light source.
This allows us to put the paper on the surface and then the
macro ring resting on top of it before the camera takes a photo
of the paper texture. The use of the macro ring also serves to
shield the effects of other ambient light sources (e.g., daylight,
office lighting). In Section V-C, we will explain the effect of
the light source by using an alternative source: a commodity
light box (tracing pad) as shown in Figure 4(c).
Our evaluations were performed on a PC with an Intel
Core i7-2600S CPU @ 2.80 GHz with 8 GB of memory. The
operating system was 64-bit Windows 7 Enterprise and we
used Matlab R2015a (64-bit) to develop our algorithms.
B. Evaluation Framework
Our work is closely related to the fields of biometrics
and Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). Biometrics is the
science of authenticating humans by measuring their unique
characteristics and have a long history of research. A paper
fingerprint works similar to biometrics, except that it measures
unique characteristics of a physical object instead of a human
being. Hence, common metrics that measure the error rate
performance of a biometric system apply to our work too.
(a) Camera and macro flash
ring.
(b) Overhead projector as light
source.
(c) Light box (tracing pad) as
light source.
Fig. 4: The equipment used in our experiments.
On the other hand, paper fingerprints are related to Physical
Unclonable Functions, which is a relatively new field starting
from Pappu et al.’s seminal paper published in Science in
2002 [17]. Typically PUFs require a challenge and response
dynamic, but according to the definition by Maes in [18], paper
can be regarded as a “non-intrinsic” PUF, i.e., a PUF that
does not contain the circuitry to produce the response on its
own. Hence, the same evaluation methods in PUF are also
applicable to paper fingerprints.
Because of the close relation to these two fields and their
respective evaluation frameworks, we evaluate our method
based on metrics used in both fields for a comprehensive
analysis. We note that previous works either use biometric
or PUF metrics, however using both allows us to perform
a meaningful comparison with related biometrics and PUF
systems. It would be interesting to study the relationships
between these metrics and define a unified framework that
can be applied to evaluate both biometric and PUF systems.
We leave this to future work.
In the following we give a brief description of these metrics.
We discuss Hamming distance distributions, decidability, and
recognition rates including false rejection and false acceptance
rates in the former category of metrics. In the latter cate-
gory, we consider uniformity and randomness in the space
dimension, reliability and steadiness in the time dimension,
and uniqueness and bit aliasing in the device dimension.
1) Biometric Metrics: A biometric authentication problem
is a specific case of a statistical decision problem in which one
decides if two given biometric measurements belong to the
same source or not. In order to provide necessary information
about the effectiveness of such a biometric, the parameters
of the so-called biometric decision landscape need to be
specified [19]. If Hamming distance is used for comparison,
as it is in our case, the distributions of Hamming distance for
two groups of comparisons need to be determined: for com-
parisons between paper fingerprints originating from the same
paper sheet, and for comparisons between paper fingerprints
originating from different paper sheets. These are called same-
group and different-group distributions, respectively.
For an effective biometric, the same-group and different-
group distributions should be well-separated. This makes the
decision problem solvable. Let µ1 and µ2 denote the means,
and σ1 and σ2 the standard deviations of the two distributions.
Daugman defines the decidability metric d′ as follows [20]:
d′ =
|µ1 − µ2|√
σ12+σ22
2
(6)
where |·| denotes absolute value. Decidability as defined above
is indicative of how well-separated the two distributions are:
the further and the more concentrated the distributions are,
the higher will the decidability be. To give an idea about
typical values, the decidability of iris recognition, a well-
established and effective biometric method, is d′ ≈ 14 in an
ideal measurement environment and d′ ≈ 7 in a non-ideal
environment [20].
After determining the same-group and different-group dis-
tributions, one decides a threshold value situated between the
two distributions. Subsequently, the decision on whether two
reported biometrics belong to the same origin or not is then
made by computing the Hamming distance between the two
biometric samples and comparing it to the threshold. For an
effective biometric, measurements from the same origin have
relatively low Hamming distance and hence fall below the
threshold, whereas measurements from different origins have
relatively high Hamming distance and fall above the threshold.
If the distributions are completely separated, the decision is
correct all the time. However in practice usually there is
some overlap between the two distributions. The proportion
of biometrics from different origins falsely accepted as being
from the same origin is known as the false acceptance rate
(FAR). The proportion of biometrics from the same origin
falsely rejected as being from different origins is known as
the false rejection rate (FRR). For an effective biometric FAR
and FRR should be low – ideally zero.
A widely used measure of effectiveness of a biometric is de-
grees of freedom (DoF). DoF is a measure of the combinatorial
complexity of the biometric test, or in other words the number
of bits in a biometric measurement that are independent [20].
Consider a biometric that provides degrees of freedom N ,
that is, N independent and unpredictable bits. A comparison
between two such biometrics from different origins can be
modelled as the probability that a threshold number of N
independently chosen bits agree. Hence, the different-group
distribution for such a biometric would follow the binomial
distribution with mean µ = p and variance σ2 = Np(1 − p),
where p is the probability of single bit agreement. Hence,
the degrees of freedom for a biometric with a different-group
distribution that follows a binomial distribution with mean µ
and variance σ2 can be calculated as follows:
N =
µ(1− µ)
σ2
(7)
2) PUF Metrics. Paper fingerprinting can be seen as an
optical physical unclonable function (PUF) [17], as pointed out
in the literature [18], [21]. However, previous works on paper
fingerprinting did not evaluate their results in this context.
We believe that evaluating our results against established PUF
metrics provides further information about the effectiveness
of our method and helps put our results in perspective within
PUF literature.
We follow the unified framework put forward by Maiti et
al. [22]. This framework provides metrics to evaluate a PUF
in three dimensions: space, time, and device. In our case,
PUFs are the paper fingerprints, and devices are the different
paper sheets. Each of these dimensions quantifies a specific
quality of a fingerprint: the space dimension analyses the
overall variations of fingerprints, the time dimension indicates
same-group consistency, and the device dimension discusses
the different-group diversity of fingerprints.
Before describing these dimensions, let us define the sym-
bols we use in this framework. Here we consider effective
fingerprints, denoted by r. The effective fingerprint is the result
of applying the appropriate mask over the original fingerprint
f . We use the following parameters: L is the number of
bits in each fingerprint (2048 in our setting). T refers to the
number of samples taken from each paper sheet in a dataset
(e.g., in the our benchmark dataset T = 10). N is the total
number of paper sheets involved in a dataset (e.g., in the our
benchmark dataset N = 100). We use the following indices
accordingly: n denotes the paper sheet number within different
sheets, t represents the sample number within the samples
from the same paper sheet, and l shows l-th bit in the effective
fingerprint.
1) Space Dimension: This dimension is concerned with
bit variations with respect to the locations of the bits in
fingerprints. Metrics in this dimension evaluate the overall
inter-sheet behaviour of fingerprints.
• Uniformity: This metric shows how uniform 0s and 1s
are in a fingerprint. The ideal value for this metric is 0.5.
Uniformity of the fingerprint from the t-th sample and
n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Uniformity(n, t) =
1
L
L∑
l=1
rn,t,l (8)
• Randomness: This metric indicates the average random-
ness of the bits in the fingerprints generated from several
acquisitions from a sheet. The ideal value for this metric
is 1. Randomness of the fingerprint bits generated from
the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Randomness(n) = −log2max(pn, 1− pn), (9)
where pn =
1
TL
T∑
t=1
L∑
l=1
rn,t,l
2) Time Dimension: This dimension is concerned with
fingerprint variations within multiple samples. Metrics in this
dimension evaluate the overall intra-sheet persistence of fin-
gerprints within multiple samples.
• Reliability: This metric shows how consistently finger-
prints are reproduced by the same sheet. The ideal
value for this metric is 1. Reliability of the fingerprints
generated from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Reliability(n) = 1− 2
T (T − 1)L
T−1∑
t1=1
T∑
t2=t1+1
L∑
l=1
(rn,t1,l⊕rn,t2,l)
(10)
• Steadiness: This metric indicates the bias of individual
fingerprint bits on average for a sheet. The ideal value for
this metric is 1. Steadiness of the fingerprints generated
from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Steadiness(n) = 1 +
1
L
L∑
l=1
log2max(pn,l, 1− pn,l)
(11)
where pn,l =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rn,t,l
3) Device Dimension: This dimension is concerned with
fingerprint variations between multiple sheets. Metrics in this
dimension evaluate the overall inter-sheet distinguishability of
fingerprints.
• Uniqueness: This metric represents how distinguishable a
sheet is within a group of sheets. The ideal value for this
metric is 0.5. Uniqueness of the fingerprints generated
from the n-th sheet is calculated as follows:
Uniqueness(n) =
1
T 2L(N − 1) ·
T∑
t=1
N∑
n′=1
n′ 6=n
T∑
t′=1
L∑
l=1
(rn,t,l⊕rn′,t′,l)
(12)
• Bit-Aliasing: This metric indicates how likely different
sheets are to produce identical fingerprint bits. The ideal
value for this metric is 0.5. Bit-aliasing of the l-th bit of
the fingerprints generated from a dataset is calculated as
follows:
Bit-Aliasing(l) =
1
NT
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
rn,t,l (13)
(a) Transmission
(b) Reflection
Fig. 5: Capturing a photo, in case of (a) transmission, and (b)
reflection, using the same digital camera and light source.
C. Reflection vs. Transmission
As discussed before, the main motivation of our work is to
capture paper textural patterns and efficiently extract unique
paper fingerprints from such patterns using an off-the-shelf
camera. By contract, previous works [3], [6], [7] extract paper
fingerprints from the paper surface. Our hypothesis is that
textural patterns revealed by the transmissive light contain
richer features than the paper surface shown by the reflective
light. To verify this hypothesis, we set up an experiment to
investigate the difference between the two patterns.
We set up the paper photographing in two settings: one with
the light source on the same side of the paper and the other
with the light source on the opposite side of the paper (see
Figure 5). In the former, we put an opaque object behind the
paper, so only the paper surface is photographed based on the
reflective light. We selected 10 common A4 (210×297 mm)
paper sheets with grammage 80 g/m2. We took 10 photos of
each sheet in each of the two settings. We used a common
overhead projector as our light source. We tried to reduce
the effect of any ambient light by setting our data collection
environment in a dark room. This data collection resulted in
two datasets: a 100-sample dataset (10 sheets with 10 samples
for each sheet) for surface measurements, and a 100-sample
dataset (10 sheets with 10 sample for each sheet) for textural
measurements.
After the data collection, we performed our fingerprint
extraction algorithm (as discussed in Section III) for both
datasets. Figure 6 shows the Hamming distance distributions
for the two cases. Each diagram depicts four distributions: for
each case i.e., surface and texture, there is one curve, concen-
trated around lower values of Hamming distance, showing the
distribution of Hamming distance between pairs of fingerprints
of the same paper sheet, and a second curve, concentrated
around a Hamming distance value of about 0.5, showing the
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Fig. 6: Hamming distance distributions for surface and texture.
distribution of Hamming distance between pairs of fingerprints
of different paper sheets.
Ideally, for effective fingerprint recognition, we want the
“same-group” and “different-group” distributions to be as
separate as possible, since then we can easily decide on a
threshold and consider any two fingerprints with a Hamming
distance below that threshold to belong to the same paper
sheet, and consider any two fingerprints with a Hamming
distance above that threshold to belong to different paper
sheets.
As can be seen in Figure 6, the two distributions, i.e.,
“same-group” and “different-group”, are well-separated in the
case of texture, but less so in the case of surface. In fact,
in the case of texture, the minimum Hamming distance for
different comparisons is 0.46 and the maximum Hamming
distance for similar comparisons is 0.27, which shows that
there is no overlap between the two distributions. However,
in the case of surface, the minimum Hamming distance for
different comparisons is 0.44 and the maximum Hamming
distance for similar comparisons is 0.48, which shows that
there is some overlap between the two distributions, and hence
false negative or false positive decisions are inevitable in this
case. Indeed, decidability for the case of texture is around
20, but for the case of surface it is around 6. Furthermore,
the number of degrees of freedom provided by the texture
is slightly higher than that provided by the surface. These
results support our hypothesis that the textural measurements
through transmissive light contain more distinctive features
than surface measurements based on reflective light, and hence
can be used as a more reliable source for paper fingerprinting.
We should stress that the hypothesis is tested using a specific
image capturing condition in which only one snapshot is taken.
One should not directly compare the results with Clarkson et
al.’s 3D method [6], which is carried out in a different test
condition and involves taking four scans from four different
angles on the paper surface. However, we believe a method
that is based on taking a single snapshot is easier and quicker
than those that require multiple measurements.
D. Determining Gabor Scale & Orientation
As discussed, Gabor filter can be configured with different
scales and orientations. To find out the appropriate combi-
nation of scales and orientation for our method, we set up
an initial experiment. We collected a dataset including two
sub-datasets: the first one includes 20 samples from one paper
sheet; the second one includes one sample from each of 20 pa-
per sheets. These two sub-datasets constitute our same-group
and different-group data, respectively. We applied Gabor filter
for 8 orientations, indexed from 1 to 8, representing angles
0, pi8 ,
pi
4 ,
3pi
8 ,
pi
2 ,
5pi
8 ,
3pi
4 , and
7pi
8 . Considering fmax = 0.25,
we also considered multiple scales, indexed by integer values
starting from scale 1. We used fixed values of η = γ =
√
2
and σ = 1.
Ideally, we would want the different-group distribution to
be centred around 0.5 or a mean very close to 0.5. Our
experiments show that for scales greater than 7, the mean
of the different-group distribution falls below 0.45, which
indicates undesirable bias on the binomial distributions (i.e.,
tossing a coin is no longer random in the a Bernoulli trial [13]).
Therefore, in the following we limit the scope of our investi-
gation to scales from 1 to 7.
Our calculations show that as the scale increases, the
decidability of the distributions increases, but at the same
time the number of the degrees of freedom the different-
group distribution provides decreases. This is because the
scale relates to the spatial frequency components of the Gabor
filer – the smaller the scale is, the more detailed the feature
extraction is. When the scale is one, the finest detail of the
paper texture is extracted, which leads to high degrees of
freedom in the generated fingerprint. However, at this scale,
the image processing is extremely sensitive to noise, which
reduces the separation between the same-group and different-
group histograms of Hamming distances. Increasing the scale
results in a zooming-out effect. More correlations between bits
are introduced, which reduces the degrees of freedom. But on
the other hand, the feature extraction is more tolerant of noise.
As a result, the same-paper and different-paper characteristics
become more distinctive, which leads to a higher decidability.
The results for decidability and degrees of freedom for
orientations 1 to 8 and scales 1 to 7 are shown in Figures 7(a)
and 7(b), respectively. Both figures also include a spline
interpolation of average values of different orientation results
within each scale to highlight the dominant trends. Therefore,
there is an evident trade-off in choosing the scale and ori-
entation. Too low a scale would not provide an acceptable
decidability, while too high a scale would not provide a
reasonable degree of freedom. Through experiments, we find
that the combination of scale 5 and orientation 7 provides a
good trade-off between decidability and degrees of freedom.
As we will explain later, this combination provides nearly
perfect recognition rates. In the rest of the paper, we report
all our findings based on this specific configuration of Gabor
filter.
E. The Benchmark Dataset
Our main dataset on which we report our evaluations is a
set of 1000 samples collected by taking 10 photos of each
of 100 different paper sheets to provide a good diversity.
We use typical office paper sheets of size A4 (210mm ×
297mm) with grammage of 80 g/m2. All the sheets were
from the same pack with the same brand. In all of the photos,
camera settings including aperture and exposure time were
kept constant. We tried to keep the paper sheets visually
aligned for the different samples, and conducted separate
experiments to evaluate the robustness of our algorithm against
rotations (which we discuss in Section V). We refer to the main
dataset collected here under relatively stable conditions as the
benchmark dataset.
F. Experiment Results
In the following, we present the results of our experiments
reporting the metrics introduced in Section IV-B. We also
present the timing measurements for our method and provide
a short discussion on its practicality. We provide comparison
with existing work whenever the relevant metrics are reported
in the literature.
Biometric metrics. We calculated the Hamming distance
for all comparisons, consisting of same-group comparisons and
different-group comparisons. There are a total of
(
1000
2
)
=
499, 500 comparisons, of which 100 ·( 102 ) = 4, 500 are same-
group comparisons and 1000×9902 = 495, 000 are different-
group comparisons. In Figure 8 we show the distributions for
the same-group and different-group Hamming distance values.
Clearly, the two distributions are well-separated, which shows
the effectiveness of our paper fingerprinting method. Indeed,
the maximum same-group Hamming distance is 0.24, whereas
the minimum different-group Hamming distance is 0.42, which
shows that there is no overlap between the two distributions.
Hence, any threshold between the above values would give us
FAR and FRR of zero. As an example, we can choose the
threshold to be 0.4, but this is adjustable. Detailed error rate
performance will be reported in Section VI-B.
Decidability for the dataset is d′ ≈ 21, which compares
favourably to d′ ≈ 14 for iris recognition in the ideal
condition [13]. The number of degrees of freedom is calculated
based on Equation 7 as N = 807, which means the entropy of
the extracted fingerprints is 807 bits out of a total of 2048 bits.
As compared to the 249 degrees of freedom for iris (which
has the same size of 2048 bits), the fingerprint in our case
is more unique and contains less redundancy. Figure 9 shows
the histogram of same-group Hamming distance values on the
left and the distribution of different-group Hamming distance
values on the right. The diagram on the right also includes a
binomial distribution curve with degrees of freedom N = 807,
mean µ = 0.495, and standard deviation σ = 0.018. Evidently,
the different-group distribution closely follows the binomial
distribution.
PUF evaluations results. The PUF metrics results on the
benchmark dataset are shown in Table II under the column
labelled “Benchmark Dataset”. It can be seen that in all
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Fig. 8: Hamming distance distributions in the benchmark
dataset.
metrics our dataset performed close to ideal values. For
comparison, we also included in Table II the PUF metrics for
two typical PUFs: Arbiter PUF, and Ring Oscillator PUF [22].
This shows that our method provides fingerprints with good
uniformity, randomness, reliability, steadiness, uniqueness, and
bit-aliasing.
Timing Results & Usability. Our paper fingerprinting
method takes 1.30 seconds on average to prepare the photo,
analyse the texture, and generate the fingerprint on a PC. This
is reasonably fast. This is in contrast with the method in [6],
which requires four scans in different directions and then
constructing a 3D surface model. Although the authors of [6]
do not report timing measurements for their fingerprinting
method, 3D modeling is generally considered a computation-
ally expensive task [23].
The whole process of paper fingerprinting in our method is
automatized and only requires a user to place the sheet of paper
on the flat surface of the overhead projector and click a button
to take a photo by a fixed camera. We note that this is only
a proof-of-concept prototype to demonstrate the feasibility of
extracting the fingerprint based on the textural patterns. One
may improve the prototype in a practical application by tighter
integration of various equipment components. For example,
at a border control, when the official swipes a page in the
passenger’s passport through a slot, the slot may have the
embedded light source on one side and a camera on the other
side. When the page is in the slot, a unique fingerprint can
be extracted. The fingerprinting area and orientation will be
relatively fixed as it is determined by the dimensions of the
slot. By comparing the extracted fingerprint with a reference
sample (e.g., stored in the back-end system), the computer
program can quickly determine if the passport page is genuine.
In Section VI, we will explain more on how to utilizing the
unique paper fingerprint in authentication protocols.
V. ROBUSTNESS EVALUATIONS
In this section we evaluate our method’s robustness in
non-ideal circumstances. First, we consider the robustness of
our method against misalignment, i.e., in cases where the
rectangular box is not aligned to the photo frame. Then, we
consider the robustness of our method against paper being
roughly handled in the following cases: the paper sheet is
crumpled, some scribbling is done in the rectangular box,
the sheet is soaked in water and dried afterwards, and the
sheet is ironed after soaking and partially burnt. Finally, we
consider the effect of using an alternative light source. In the
following, we give the details of each experiment and provide
the biometric and PUF metrics in each of the cases.
A. Impact of Non-Ideal Data Collection
Photo Rotation. The orientation of the photo is the angle
between the rectangular box and the photo frame. A rotated
photo is shown in Figure 10(b). The maximum rotation we
can have such that the box is still fully captured within the
boundary of the photo frame is around 12◦. We selected 10
paper sheets and collected 5 samples in each angle within
{−12◦,−11◦, . . . , 0◦, . . . , ,+11◦,+12◦}. This gives us 125
samples per sheet, 1250 samples in total.
Figure 11 shows the Hamming distance distributions. As
expected, the same-group and different-group distributions get
slightly closer to each other in comparison with the benchmark
dataset. However, decidability, although reduced, is still a
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Fig. 9: Histograms of Hamming distances in the benchmark dataset.
TABLE I: False recognition rates of all datasets considering a fractional HD threshold of 0.4
Rate Ideal Benchmark Rotated Crumpled Scribbled Soaked Heated Mixed
Value Dataset Light
FAR 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
FRR 0% 0% 0.32% 3.2% 0% 0% 0% 0%
TABLE II: PUF metrics for all datasets and two typical PUFs
PUF Ideal Arbiter PUF (APUF) Ring Oscillator PUF Benchmark
Metrics Value [22] [22] Dataset
Average Uniformity 0.5 0.556 0.505 0.466
Average Randomness 1.0 0.846 0.968 0.907
Average Reliability 1.0 0.997 0.991 0.945
Average Steadiness 1.0 0.984 0.985 0.938
Average Uniqueness 0.5 0.072 0.472 0.465
Average Bit Aliasing 0.5 0.195 0.505 0.466
TABLE III: Impact of Robustness Experiments on PUF metrics
PUF Ideal Benchmark Rotated Crumpled Scribbled Soaked Heated Mixed
Metrics Value Dataset Light
Average Uniformity 0.5 0.466 0.466 0.463 0.454 0.460 0.460 0.466
Average Randomness 1.0 0.907 0.906 0.896 0.873 0.877 0.890 0.907
Average Reliability 1.0 0.945 0.877 0.852 0.856 0.750 0.882 0.905
Average Steadiness 1.0 0.938 0.839 0.528 0.870 0.554 0.554 0.874
Average Uniqueness 0.5 0.465 0.465 0.470 0.468 0.463 0.461 0.465
Average Bit Aliasing 0.5 0.466 0.466 0.463 0.454 0.460 0.460 0.466
(a) Benchmark (b) Rotated (c) Crumpled (d) Scribbled
Fig. 10: The captured photo under near-ideal and non-ideal situations.
healthy d′ ≈ 8. This shows that our image processing method
is somewhat sensitive to the image rotation. We believe there is
still room to improve the robustness against rotation, however
with the current method and based on a threshold of 0.4, the
FAR is still 0%, and the FRR is less than 1%. These values
can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table II. The experiment
dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing,
but there is a slight drop in reliability, steadiness, and unique-
ness compared to the benchmark dataset.
The experiment shows that our method is robust against
non-ideal data collection in terms of rotation. In comparison,
Clarkson et al. do not report robustness against rotation and
in fact require “precise alignment of each surface point across
all scans” [6].
B. Impact of Non-Ideal Paper Handling
In this section we investigate the robustness of our method
against rough handling of paper sheet including crumpling,
scribbling, soaking, and heating. For each of the experiments
in this section, a set of 10 paper sheets are selected. For
each paper sheet, 5 samples were taken before and 5 samples
after the non-ideal handling of the paper sheet, adding up
to a total of 100 samples per experiment. The same-group
and different-group distributions under the test conditions
of crumpling, scribbling, soaking and heating are shown in
Figure 11. For readability, we opt to show fitted curves for
the distributions. These curves are non-parametric fits with a
threshold bandwidth of 0.02 (i.e., the distributions are merely
smoothed).
Crumpling. In this experiment, we crumpled our paper
sheets to the extent that the borders of the rectangular box
were visibly distorted. We did not try to smooth out the sheet
surface after crumpling. An example of a photo taken from a
crumpled paper sheet can be seen in Figure 10(c).
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in
Figure 11. Decidability is d′ ≈ 4.6. Based on the threshold of
0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and the FRR is 3.2%. These values
can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment
dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing,
but there is a slight drop in reliability and uniqueness and a
bigger drop in steadiness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Scribbling. In this experiment, we drew random patterns
with a black pen over all samples such that each pattern covers
around 5% of the box area. An example of such scribbling can
be seen in Figure 10(d). Our preprocessing phase successfully
identifies the scribbled area in the mask in all samples.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in
Figure 11. The maximum same-group Hamming distance is
0.25 and the minimum different-group Hamming distance is
0.45. The distributions are well-separated. Decidability is d′ ≈
9.7. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and
the FRR is also 0%. These values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment
dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing,
but there is a slight drop in reliability, steadiness, and unique-
ness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Soaking. In this experiment, we submerged the paper sheets
in tap water for around 20 seconds. Then, we let them dry
naturally and collected the after-soaking samples from the
dried sheets.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in
Figure 11. The maximum same-group Hamming distance is
0.36 and the minimum different-group Hamming distance is
0.44. The distributions are well-separated. Decidability is d′ ≈
6.8. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and
the FRR is also 0%. These values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment
dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing,
but there is a slight drop in reliability and uniqueness and a
bigger drop in steadiness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Heating. In this experiment, we ironed all the papers from
the soaking experiment for at least 20 seconds, to the extent
that in some cases there was a clearly visible colour change
(to light brown) and the paper was partly burnt.
The resulting Hamming distance distributions are shown in
Figure 11. The maximum same-group Hamming distance is
0.30 and the minimum different-group Hamming distance is
0.44. The distributions are well-separated. Decidability is d′ ≈
8.6. Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR is still 0%, and
the FRR is also 0%. These values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The experiment
dataset still has good uniformity, randomness, and bit-aliasing,
but there is a slight drop in reliability and uniqueness and a
bigger drop in steadiness compared to the benchmark dataset.
Summary. Taking all the above results into consideration,
we can see that our method shows the strongest robustness
against scribbling. Both the biometric and PUF measures
support this observation. The Hamming distance distributions
are well-separated and all PUF metrics remain close to ideal
values. Fingerprinting is also fairly robust against rotation,
soaking, and heating. There is no or negligible false rejection
rates and all PUF metrics possibly except for steadiness remain
close to ideal values. Crumpling seems to pose the strongest
challenge to robustness. Although false rejection rate is 3.2%
and steadiness is not ideal, the method is still able to provide
0% false acceptance rate and healthy PUF metrics otherwise.
Focusing on biometric metrics, authentication rates remain
perfect or nearly perfect under all robustness tests. This means
our method provides a promising candidate for paper-based
document authentication in practice which is able to cope with
non-ideal sample collection and rough handling.
Focusing on PUF metrics, space and device dimension met-
rics stay close to ideal values under all tests, which indicates
that the quality of fingerprint bits are still good and the
sheets remain clearly distinguishable from one another. Time
dimension metrics remain close to ideal values for rotation and
scribbling, but steadiness and in some cases reliability drops as
a result of crumpling, soaking, or heating. This is expected as
crumpling, soaking, and heating physically change the paper
sheets.
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(a) Fitted distributions under rotation.
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(b) Fitted distributions under non-ideal paper handling.
Fig. 11: The Hamming distance distributions for robustness experiments.
C. Impact of a Different Light Source
The light source should be bright enough to reveal the
texture patterns in a paper sheet. In the proof-of-concept
experiments, we used an overhead projector, however, the
equipment is relatively bulky and expensive. Questions remain
if there are cheaper ways to obtain the light source and if the
results are robust against using a different light source. To
investigate this, we purchased a commodity light box (tracing
pad) from Amazon for £49.99 (see Figure 4(c)). Then, we used
the same paper sheets as in the benchmark dataset–excluding
10 paper sheets that were used in other robustness tests–to
collect a new set of samples using the new light source. We
followed the same data collection procedure as before.
Due to the difference in the light intensity, the camera
setting needs to be adjusted. In particular, we altered the
exposure time to 1/500 seconds and F-stop to f/5. These values
were automatically recommended by the camera, so we simply
accepted them. The exposure time is the duration that the
shutter takes to capture a photo and F-Stop is the radius of the
lens diaphragm; both of them are inspired by the way human
eyes react to a light source. These modifications in the camera
setting were necessary because of the change in the intensity
of the light source. The final dataset included 900 captured
images, 10 samples from each paper sheet.
Figure 12(a) shows the Hamming distance distributions
using the light box. The same-group and different-group
distributions are well-separated from each other. Applying the
biometric metrics, our analysis shows the decidability d′ ≈ 24
and the number of the degrees of freedom DoF ≈ 846, both
slightly higher than those obtained with the overhead projector.
Based on the threshold of 0.4, the FAR and FRR are still 0%.
These values can be found in Table I.
The PUF metrics are presented in Table III. The new
experiment results show that all PUF metrics are comparable
to those obtained earlier in the benchmark dataset.
Figure 12(b) shows the Hamming distance distribution by
combining the light box and overhead projector datasets. The
number of the degrees of freedom is roughly unchanged at
DoF ≈ 836. However, the same-group data become noisier
because of mixing two different light sources. The decidability
drops to 10. Despite of the mix of different light sources, the
same-group and different-group histograms are still clearly
separated. The maximum Hamming distance for the same-
group samples is 0.31 while the minimum Hamming distance
of the different-group is 0.42.
The experiment shows that our method is robust against
different light sources, as long as the camera settings are set
correctly.
VI. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we explain authentication protocols based
on the extracted paper fingerprint, and discuss their practical
performance.
A. Trust assumptions
Our fingerprinting technique may be applied in a range of
applications, e.g., to prevent counterfeiting of paper currency,
passports, certificates, contracts and official receipts. The se-
cure use of the fingerprint is based on two assumptions. Both
assumptions are generally required in biometrics and physical
unclonable functions (PUF) applications.
The first assumption is physical “unclonability”. We assume
it is infeasible to physically clone a paper sheet with the
same paper texture. The paper texture is formed from ran-
domly interleaved wooden particles, as a naturally occurring
outcome of the paper manufacturing process. This process
can not be precisely controlled. Repeating exactly the same
process to produce the same paper texture is considered to be
prohibitively expensive, if not impossible [24].
The second assumption is about a trustworthy measuring
process. Take the human fingerprint authentication as an
example. If an attacker is able to deceive the scanner by
presenting a gummy finger, the security guarantee based on the
“unclonability” assumption will be lost. In any biometric or
PUF application, it is important to ensure that the measurement
is performed on a real object and a fresh measurement is
acquired. In practice, this is often realized through the human
supervision in the process or by using specialized equipment
(e.g., iris scanners with embedded liveness test). In the case
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Fig. 12: Distributions of HDs for the light box experiment.
of paper documents, visual inspection can be applied to check
that they are made of paper and the paper fiber texture has
not been tampered with. An attacker may try to interfere with
the texture measurement by printing patterns on the paper
surface. Using today’s commodity printers, it seems unlikely
that an attacker is able to print patterns that are precise at the
pixel level under the microscopic view of a high-resolution
camera (since the print head cannot be precisely controlled
and each printed dot tends to be in a scattered pattern due to
imperfection of the printing process; see [6]). However, when
the measurement is not guaranteed to be coming from real
paper texture, the acquisition process is no longer trustworthy
– an attacker can at least deny the authentication by printing
random patterns with strong contrast on the paper. This threat
can be addressed by checking that the intended area for
authentication is free from overprinting.
B. Comparison based on Hamming distance
A straightforward application of authenticating a paper fin-
gerprint is based on comparing the Hamming distance between
two fingerprints. It consists of two phases. In the first phase, a
paper fingerprint, along with a mask, is extracted from the
textural patterns as the template and stored in a database.
In the second phase, given a provided paper sheet, the same
fingerprinting algorithm is followed to output a new fingerprint
and a mask. Depending on the applications, there are two types
of authentication modes: verification or recognition.
Verification works on a one-to-one comparison. This as-
sumes the reference to the stored template is known (as it
is often provided by the authenticating subject). Hence, once
the template is retrieved, it is a straightforward comparison
between two fingerprints based on their Hamming distance as
explained in Equation 5. This comparison determines if the
presented paper sheet is the same as the one registered earlier.
By contrast, recognition works on a one-to-many compari-
son. In this case, the reference to the pre-stored template is un-
known. Hence, the program searches throughout the database,
comparing the extracted fingerprint exhaustively with each
of the stored templates in order identify a match where the
Hamming distance is sufficiently small. This is the same as
how iris recognition works.
In terms of accuracy, the recognition mode is far more
demanding than the verification mode, because the false ac-
cept rate accumulates with the size of the database. As an
illustration, let P1 be the false acceptance rate for one-to-one
matching in the verification mode. Assume P1 is very small.
Let Pn be the false acceptance rate in the recognition mode
for a database of n records.
Pn = 1− (1− P1)n
≈ n · P1
The above equation shows that the accumulative false accep-
tance rate in the one-to-many mode increases roughly linearly
with the size of the database [13]. Hence, for the one-to-many
matching to work accurately, the false acceptance rate for the
one-to-one comparison must be extremely small.
For the paper fingerprints extracted in our proposal, they
have sufficient entropy to support precise recognition even for
an extremely large database. Based on the binomial distribu-
tions with 807 degrees of freedom, the false acceptance rates
for comparing two paper fingerprints are listed in Table IV.
If we opt to maintain Pn < 10−6 for the recognition mode
as stated in [13], our algorithm can easily support searching a
database of 3 quintillions (3×1018) fingerprints at a threshold
of 0.32. By comparison, for the same accuracy (< 10−6) and
the same threshold (0.32), iris recognition can only support
a database of only 26 iris codes. (As stated in [13], for a
database of a million iris codes, the threshold needs to be
adjusted downwards to below 0.27 to keep the false accept rate
under 10−6). Because of the much higher degrees of freedom
of paper fingerprints, they can be used for the recognition
application at a much larger scale than the iris biometric.
TABLE IV: False Acceptance Rate (FAR) for comparing two
fingerprints
HD Threshold False acceptance rate
0.30 7.1× 10−31
0.31 5.3× 10−28
0.32 2.7× 10−25
0.33 1.0× 10−22
0.34 2.5× 10−20
0.35 4.5× 10−18
0.36 5.8× 10−16
0.37 5.2× 10−14
0.38 3.3× 10−12
0.39 1.5× 10−10
0.40 5.2× 10−9
C. Paper fingerprint encryption
One limitation with the previous verification/recognition
method is that the template is stored in plaintext in the
database. When the plaintext template is revealed, it may
cause degradation of security. This is especially the case with
biometrics, since biometric data is considered private to each
individual. Paper fingerprints are essentially “biometrics” of
paper. One established technique in biometrics is through
biometric encryption. Similarly, we can apply the similar
technique to realize fingerprint encryption. We will present
one concrete construction and show that because paper finger-
prints have much higher entropy than even the most accurate
biometric in use (iris), the corresponding encryption scheme
is able to provide much higher security assurance as well.
Our construction is based on Hao et al.’s scheme [25]. This
work is inspired by Juels et al. [26] and has been successfully
implemented in iris recognition. It comprises two phases. In
phase one, the program extracts a paper fingerprint from the
paper texture as a reference fa. It then generates a random
key k (140 bits), and expands the key to a pseudo fingerprint
fp = ErrorCC(k) (a 2048-bit codeword) where ErrorCC
is an error-correction encoding scheme based on Hadamard-
Reed-Solomon. Our analysis shows there is a combination
of block and random errors in our fingerprints; therefore, we
selected a concatenated approach. The choice of 140 bits k is
a balance between security (minimum 128 bit security for the
secret key) and performance, as well as considering the special
parametric requirements for a concatenated code scheme to
work at a desired level of error correction. Subsequently, the
scheme computes an encrypted fingerprint r = fa ⊕ fp. In
addition, the program computes h = H(k) where H is a
secure one-way hash function. Finally, the program stores r
and h in the database. Alternatively, r and h can be stored in
a 2-D barcode printed on paper. The advantage of doing so is
to allow authentication in the off-line mode. In this case, an
additional digital signature s should be included to prove the
authenticity of data in the barcode. At this stage, the original
template fa and the random key k can be safely deleted.
The registration process is summarized in Algorithm 1. In
Figure 13, we show a QR code generated from the registration
phase in our prototype implementation.
Fig. 13: Generated QR Code in the authentication protocol.
This QR code contains the encrypted fingerprint, H(k) and a
digital signature for both items.
The second phase is authentication. In this phase, data from
the 2-D barcode is first read and the digital signature verified.
A paper fingerprint fs is extracted from the provided paper
sheet. The program then computes:
fs ⊕ r = fs ⊕ (fa ⊕ ErrorCC(k))
= (fs ⊕ fa)⊕ ErrorCC(k)
= e⊕ ErrorCC(k)
In the above equation, e can be regarded as “noise” added
to the codeword ErrorCC(k). As we explained earlier, the
Hamming distances between same-paper fingerprints typically
range from 0 to 0.25. In the definition of the Hadamard-
Reed-Solomon code, we follow the same coding parameters
as in [25]. The resultant error correction code is capable of
correcting up to 27% error bits in a 2048-bit codeword. Hence,
by running the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon decoding scheme,
the error vector e can be effectively removed, and the original
k can be recovered error-free. The correctness of the decoding
process can be verified by comparing the obtained k against
the retrieved H(k). This authentication process is summarized
in Algorithm 2.
ALGORITHM 1: Registration
Generate Random key k ;
Generate Reference Paper Fingerprint fa;
Expand key k to Pseudo Fingerprint fp ;
Calculate r = fa ⊕ fp ;
Calculate h = H(k) ;
Calculate Digital Signature s = Sig(r, h) ;
Store (r, h, s) in a 2-D barcode ;
ALGORITHM 2: Verification
Read r, h = H(k) and s = Sig(r, h) ;
if Signature Verification Success then
Generate Paper Fingerprint fs ;
Calculate f ′ = fs ⊕ r ;
Acquire k′ by decoding f ′ ;
Calculate H(k′) ;
if H(k′)==H(k) then
Success ;
else
Failure ;
else
Failure ;
The key feature of the above “fingerprint encryption”
scheme is that it preserves the secrecy of the fingerprint tem-
plate since it forms the basis for authentication. In this way, no
fingerprint template is stored in the plain form. As an example
for comparison, without using this encryption scheme, the
barcode would contain the plain fingerprint template. Once
in the line of sight to an attacker, the barcode can be trivially
read say by using a video camera, hence the template will be
stolen. With the encryption scheme applied, the attacker would
need physical access to the paper in order to take a close-up
snapshot of the fiber textures with a bright light source shining
underneath the paper. This makes the attack significantly more
difficult to carry out in practice without the user noticing it.
Hence, the application of privacy preserving protocol for
authentication avoids storing the texture structure in the plain
text form. The goal here is to protect the paper texture from
an attacker who does not have physical access to the paper
sheet itself. An adversary who has access to the barcode
printed on the paper can read all data including an encrypted
fingerprint r = fa ⊕ ErrorCC(k). One potential problem
as highlighted in [25] is that if the fingerprint fa contains
significant correlations between bits, r may leak information
about the fingerprint. The authors of [25] use the iris code as
an example to illustrate that due to a high level of redundancy
in iris codes, the encrypted iris code only has a lower-bound
security of 44 bits. However, 44 bits security is not sufficient
to satisfy high security requirements. As a result, the encrypted
iris code (also called the secure sketch in the PUF literature)
should not be published as public data; instead, it should be
stored in a personal token as suggested in [25].
The above limitation with the iris codes does not apply in
our case. Although the paper fingerprint defined in our work
has the same size as an iris code (2048 bits), it has much higher
degrees of freedom (807 as compared to 249). Following the
same sphere-packing bound as defined in [25], we estimate
the lower-bound security for the encrypted fingerprints as
follows. Here, the lower-bound security refers to the minimum
efforts required for a successful brute-force attack, under the
assumption that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the
correlations within the document paper sheet’s fingerprint,
hence the uncertainty (or entropy) about the fingerprint is
807 bits instead 2048 bits. The error correction capability
for the Hadamard-Reed-Solomon code allows correcting up
to 27% error bits. So in principle the attacker only needs to
guess a fingerprint that is within the Hamming distance of
807×0.27 ≈ 218 bits to the correct fingerprint. Following the
estimation method in [25], based on the sphere-packing bound
[27], the minimum guess effort with z = 807 and w = 218 is
calculated with the following equation:
G ≥ 2
z∑w
i=0
(
z
i
) = 2133 (14)
The above bound states that an attacker with full knowledge
about fingerprint correlations and the error correction process
would need at least 2133 attempts in order to uncover the
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Fig. 14: Histogram of Hamming distances between raw
fingerprints without masks.
original fingerprint used in the registration and the random
key k. This 133-bit security is much higher than the 44-
bit security reported in [25], and is sufficient for almost
all practical applications. This is possible because the paper
textural patterns are far more distinctive than iris textural
patterns. In iris, there exist substantial correlations along the
radial structures [13]. The same phenomenon does not exist in
paper texture, which explains the higher degrees of freedom
in our case. This high level of security makes it possible to
simply store the (r, h, s) values on a barcode instead of in a
secure database. Alternatively, they may be stored in an RFID
chip, and retrieved wirelessly during the verification phrase
(e.g., in an e-passport application).
We evaluate the performance of this authentication scheme
based on the benchmark database and are able to report
perfect error rates: 0% FRR and 0% FAR. Note that this
performance evaluation is slightly different from the direct
comparison between two fingerprints based on their Ham-
ming distance. The authentication is successful, only if the
Hadamard-Reed-Solomon code is able to correct the errors
(introduced by the XOR between two fingerprints) added to the
error correction codeword, and hence recover the same random
k (verified again H(k)). The authentication protocol can
only accommodate raw fingerprints, without masks (see [25]).
Figure 14 shows the histogram of Hamming distance between
raw fingerprints without masks. The same-paper and different-
paper distributions are well-separated. The error correct code
we implemented corrects errors up to 27%. This is sufficient to
correct errors for all same-paper fingerprints, yet not sufficient
for different-paper fingerprints. This explains the 0% FRR and
0% FAR that we obtain (see Figure 14).
VII. RELATED WORK
In the introduction (Section I), we highlight three prominent
works in the field (Nature 2005, IEEE S&P 2009, CCS 2011),
which have inspired our work. In this section, we conduct a
more comprehensive review of the related work.
Special paper. Some researchers proposed to fingerprint
paper by embedding special materials. Bauder [28] was the
first to propose the idea of a certificate of authenticity (COA),
which is a collection of fibers randomly positioned in an object
and permanently fixed by using transparent gluing material.
Once an end-point of a fiber is exposed to light, the other end
is illuminated, and as a whole this creates unique illuminated
patterns, which can be captured by a light detector. The main
intended application is to use COA for banknotes to ensure
authenticity. Kirovski [29] followed up Bauder’s work and
proposed to combine the captured illuminated patterns with
arbitrary text, signed with the private key of the banknote
issuer. The signature is then encoded as a barcode and printed
on the banknote. Chen et al. [30] proposed an improved
scanner to achieve automated verification of fiber-based COAs.
In a similar work, Bulens et al. [31] proposed to embed
different material–ultra-violet fibers–into the paper mixture,
and use a UV scanner to obtain a unique fingerprint. The
authors report that the derived fingerprints have 72-bit entropy.
Unmodified Paper and using laser. One limitation with
all the works mentioned above is that they require modifying
the paper manufacturing process. Other researchers investigate
fingerprinting techniques that can work with ordinary paper
without altering the manufacturing process at all. One promi-
nent work along this line of research is due to Buchanan et
al. [3] published in Nature 2005. The researchers proposed to
use a focused laser beam to scan across a sheet of standard
white paper and continuously record the reflected intensity
from four different angles by using four photodetectors. The
laser reflection is random, and is determined by the non-
uniform paper surface. Hence, the recorded reflection inten-
sities constitute a unique fingerprint. Beijnum et al. followed
up this research idea in [4]. They formulated a criterion for
recognition that limits the false acceptance rate (FAR) to 0.1%.
Samul et al. [5] presented a similar idea of shooting a beam
of laser onto the surface of the paper. But instead of using
photodetectors, they proposed to use a CCD camera to capture
the microscopic patterns of speckles.
Unmodified paper and using light. Laser-based finger-
printing methods have the limitation that they require special
laser equipment. A more cost-effective solution is to use a
commonly available light source. Metois et al. [32] proposed
custom-built equipment called the “imager”, which consists
of a consumer-grade video module and lens, housed along
with an embedded lighting apparatus. The imager provides a
grayscale snapshot of the naturally occurring inhomogeneities
of the paper surface. The snapshot is then processed into a vec-
tor of real numbers. The authentication of paper fingerprints
is based on computing the correlation coefficient between
vectors. The equal error rate (EER) is reported to be about
9%.
Clarkson et al. [6] proposed a similar method to fingerprint
a paper document by using a commodity scanner instead of
a specially built “imager”. Their work was motivated by the
observation that when viewed up close, the surface of a sheet
of paper is a tangled mat of wood fibers with a rich three-
dimensional texture that is random and hard to reproduce.
Utilizing the embedded light emission, the researchers use a
commodity scanner to scan a paper sheet in four different
orientations. Then a 3-D model is constructed based on these
four scans. Furthermore, the 3-D model is compressed into a
feature vector through computing Voronoi distributions in the
scanned region. The comparison between two feature vectors
is based on computing the correlation coefficient.
Pham et al. [33] adopted the same approach as Clarkson et
al. [6] by using an EPSON 10000XL scanner at 600 dpi to
collect 10 scans of the paper surface. In particular, they look
at the case when text has been printed over the authentication
zone, and propose two methods of pixel inpainting to remove
printed text (or marks) from the authentication zone in order
to allow ordinary correlation to be performed. Different from
the proposed method of Clarkson et al. [6] that compresses the
scanned images into a compact feature vector and compares
feature vectors based on the correlation coefficient, Pham et al.
proposed to use alpha-masked imaging matching to compare
regions of the two paper surface images. Improvements are
demonstrated using the collected data sets in their experiments.
Sharma et al. [7] proposed a different surface-based fin-
gerprinting method. Unlike prior paper fingerprinting tech-
niques [6], [33] that extract fingerprints based on the fiber
structure of paper, their method uses a USB microscope to
capture the “surface speckle pattern”, a random bright and dark
region formation at the microscopic level when light falls on
the paper surface. The captured patterns are then processed
into a vector of digits, which form the unique fingerprint.
Fingerprints are compared based on the Euclidean distance
between the two vectors.
Beekhof et al. [34] proposed a fingerprinting method based
on measuring random micro-structures of the paper surface.
The random micro-structural patterns are captured by using a
mobile phone camera with macro lens mounted. The captured
image is compressed into a binary feature vector by first
hashing the image values into a list of codewords and then
running the decoding process through a reference list decoding
(RLD) technique. Two feature vectors are compared based on
the Hamming distance.
Smith et al. [35] proposed another method to capture light
reflections from paper surface. Their method involves printing
an 8mm box on paper, and then taking a snapshot of it. The
alignment can then be done automatically by software based
on the printed box, but no details are given in the paper. The
authors apply a “texture hash function” to generate the fin-
gerprints. Fingerprints are authenticated based on computing
correlations of the texture hash strings.
Haist and Tiziani [36] proposed a method to fingerprint
German banknotes by using a CCD digital camera to take
a snapshot of a banknote based on transmissive light. Then,
the snapshot is saved as a JPEG image (2.86 KB), which,
along with a digital signature, is printed on the banknote as a
string of 3250 ASCII characters on an area of 5 cm2. However,
no prototype implementation is reported. The verification is
performed by applying the Fourier transform to obtain a
feature vector and computing the correlation between the two
vectors. Their idea is the closest to ours in terms of using
transmissive light. However, our work is substantially different
from theirs in several important aspects. First, their work
involves testing only three German Deutsche Mark banknotes
while the test data sets used in our work are far more extensive.
Second, they do not perform image pre-processing. As a result,
the positioning and orientation are done manually rather than
automatically by a software algorithm as in our case. Third,
they do not carry out image encoding. Consequently, they need
to store a JPEG image (2.86 KB), while we only need to store a
compact fingerprint (256 byte). Fourth, they do not implement
their idea in a prototype system. Hence the feasibility remains
uncertain. Most importantly, the Haist-Tiziani paper does not
report any error rate performance, or any entropy analysis, and
it does not perform extensive robustness tests as we have done.
Renesse [37] proposed a 3-dimensional-structure authenti-
cation system (3DAS) to authenticate a standard PVC ID-
card that has a 3×3 mm2 3DAS-structure in a transparent
window. The 3DAS-structure contains spunlaid fibers that are
thermally bonded at their cross points. In their experiment
setup, two infrared emitting diodes (IREDs) are used as
lighting sources to shine on the 3DAS area from two different
angles. This creates two shadow images that are then captured
by a two-dimensional CCD-array. By alternatively switching
both IREDs the required parallel images are produced. Finally,
a 20-byte fingerprint is obtained by calculating the centres
of gravity of the captured images. However, Renesse’s paper
does not report error rate performance or perform any entropy
analysis. It does not report robustness tests either.
Summary. We have presented related paper-fingerprinting
techniques proposed in the literature, which have different
requirements on paper material, use different types of illumi-
nating sources and scanning equipment, apply different signal
processing techniques and obtain fingerprints of different types
and features. Our work advances the state-of-the-art in this
field by presenting the first practical solution that works with
ordinary paper, uses an ordinary lighting source combined with
an off-the-shelf camera, takes only 1.3 seconds to produce a
compact fingerprint (256 bytes) from one snapshot, achieves
an ideal 0% FFR, 0% FAR as well as very high entropy
(807 bits) in fingerprints, and is demonstrably robust against
rotation, crumpling, scribbling, soaking and heating. The near
perfect result is attributed to the idea of capturing the paper
textural patterns through transmissive light. As detailed in
Section IV-B, using transmissive light reveals richer textu-
ral patterns than reflective light and produces more reliable
features. This explains our superior result as compared to the
earlier surface-based paper fingerprinting methods [3], [6], [7].
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this research, we propose to fingerprint a paper sheet
based on its texture patterns instead of features on the surface
as done by previous work. We show the former contain more
distinctive features than the latter with higher decidability in
the histogram of Hamming distance distributions. The exper-
iments are set up to use a commodity camera to photograph
the texture patterns with a light source shining on the other
side of the paper. The rich texture pattens are processed using
Gabor wavelets to generate a compact 2048-bit fingerprint
code. Based on the collected database, we report zero error
rates, and the method is shown to work well with different
light sources, and is resistant against various distortions such
as crumpling, scribbling, soaking and heating. The extracted
fingerprints contain 807 degrees-of-freedom, which is suffi-
ciently high for many practical applications. As an example,
some applications (like e-passport) rely on a tamper-resistant
RFID chip embedded in the paper document for proving the
authenticity of the document (through a challenge-response
protocol based on a long-term secret stored in the chip).
Our method provides an alternative solution that leverages the
natural physical properties of the paper document instead of
the tamper resistance of an extra embedded chip.
In this paper, we have focused testing our method on office
paper sheets. In future, we plan to extend our study to other
types of paper, such as thermal paper, labels and passport
pages as long as the light can transmit through. However,
based on the thickness of the paper and the difference in the
texture materials, we believe it is likely that some changes in
the intensity of the light, camera settings, Gabor filter scale
and orientation will need to be made. These questions will be
addressed in the future work.
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